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Abstract  
 
This paper examines the production and management of an ideological 
representation of a specific political ‘event’: the Romanian ‘revolution’ of 1989. A 
critical discursive psychological approach to analyzing political discourse is used to 
examine commemorative addresses in the Romanian parliament. The analysis explores: 
a) issues of agency, entitlement, and working with regard to actual or possible 
alternatives, b) a pattern of recurring categorical incumbency shifts, c) managing the 
authenticity and the true nature of the ‘event’ through invoking category-bound 
knowledge and predicates commonsensically attachable to the notion of ‘revolution’, d) 
formulating and orienting to the ‘events of 1989’ as recognizable and accountable as 
‘revolution’ and ‘foundational’ moment in national history. It is argued that the main 
ideological function of drawing on such resources is that of framing/reframing, 
controlling the various interpretations, public (re)formulations of the Romanian 
‘revolution’, disconnecting it from its controversial particulars and delegitimizing 
criticism. For a political ‘event’ to acquire an ‘identity’, it needs to be cast into a 
category with associated characteristics or features. The occasioned ideological and 
political significance of a political ‘event’ lies also in its consequentiality in and for the 
social and ideological context in which it is invoked. 
 
Key words: political event, collective memory, commemoration, Romanian 
revolution, discursive psychology, category memberships, category-bound knowledge, 
category-bound predicates 
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Introduction 
After the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, the relevance of history as 
collective remembering has acquired deeper and wider significance. The revolutionary 
fervor of 1989 Eastern Europe has marked the beginning of a process of reckoning with 
the Communist regime and thus attempting to coming to terms with the national past. 
Issues of collective memory and collective remembering in post-communist Eastern 
Europe have been the subject of numerous analyses including, among others, subjects 
such as the revival of far-right ideologies from the 30s (Shafir, 2000), historical 
revisionism and conspiracy traditions (Voicu, 2000; Byford and Billig, 2001), the 
crimes, terror and repression of Communism (Courtois, 1999), remembrance of victims 
of the Holocaust (Ioanid, 2000) and the Gulag (Todorov, 1999).  
Despite the interest in collective memory and collective remembering from 
discursive psychologists (e.g., Billig, 1999; Middleton and Edwards, 1990; Middleton & 
Brown, 2005), cultural psychologists (e.g., White, 1997; Wertsch, 2002) and critical 
discourse analysts (e.g., de Cillia et al.,1999; Wodak and de Cillia, 2007), there have 
been few studies focusing on Eastern Europe and the discursive practices that nation-
states use to understand history in ‘official contexts involving public institutions and 
texts’ (White, 1997, p. 64; but see Ahonen, 1997; Luczynski, 1997; Tulviste and Wertsch, 
1994; Wertsch, 2002). Less attention has been paid to Eastern Europe, to ideologies of 
freedom, discourses of social change and local meanings associated with it. 
It is fair to say that discursive and cultural psychological investigations of 
collective memory, in both Western and Eastern European contexts, have mainly 
‘approached their subject more as a site of active contestation and negotiation than as a 
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means for accurately representing the past’ (Wertsch, 2002: 35). This paper situates 
itself in the context of the study of collective memory in Eastern Europe, and illustrates 
some of the ways in which discourse analytic work might shed light on the workings of 
collective memory and collective remembering production and dissemination. It starts 
from the assumption that ‘instead of being some sort of steady-made attribute of 
individuals or groups, collective remembering turns out to involve an array of complex 
relationships between active agents and the narrative tools they employ’ (Wertsch, 
2002: 148). It also relies on the idea that ‘cultures and groups celebrate their pasts by 
creating histories which simultaneously involve collective remembering and forgetting’ 
(Billig, 1999: 170), as remembering and forgetting ‘are tightly bound together as social 
practices’ (ibid.,: 164) 
Collective memory, transformation and change in Eastern European societies have 
been usually approached with a concern of mapping and explaining the ‘macro’ 
processes of change and transformation. Discourses of ‘transition’ and change have 
been placed within diverse explanatory historical and political frameworks, but not 
necessarily within (political) actors’ own categorial constructions of change and 
collective remembrance of the (national) past.   
In Eastern Europe, the concept of ‘revolution’ has been seen as constituting and 
being constitutive of the ‘downfall’ of totalitarian regimes and (re)birth of democracy. 
In theorizing the ‘revolutions’ in Eastern Europe (cf. inter alia Antohi and Tismǎneanu, 
2000; Banac, 1992; Tism neanu, 1999) the main concern has been with interpreting 
the ‘great transformation’, focusing on social conditions and preconditions of change, 
causes, meanings and legacies of the 1989 ‘dramatic’ transformation.    
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My interest in this paper is not to offer a critique of the psychological, sociological or 
political interpretation and theorizing of ‘revolution’(s) (with or without reference to 
Eastern Europe) or focusing on the general aspects of ‘revolution’(s). What I would like 
to do instead is to draw attention to the idea that a focus on processes of interpretation 
and definition of a political ‘event’ (like ‘revolution’) moves us away from the 
perspective of the social and political actors themselves.  
The narrative and auto/biographical dimensions of transformation and change have 
not substantively figured among the main concerns of psychologists, sociologists (of 
change) or political scientists (but see e.g., Andrews, 2000; Konopasek and Andrews, 
2000; Tism neanu and Iliescu, 2006)1. Representing a political ‘event’ is as much an 
issue for ‘members’ (social and political actors), as it is for academic discourse. It is 
suggested that, studying the representation of a political ‘event’ entails examining ‘how 
participants’ versions occur as parts of practices, rather than as reflections on them’ 
(Edwards, 1997: 76, italics in original). Examining social and political actors’ versions of 
political ‘events’, as constituting and being constitutive of dimensions of social and 
ideological practices, involves the studying of ‘the categories that members use by 
attempting to find them in the activities in which they’re employed’ (Sacks, 1995: 27). It 
also involves examining participants’ versions within a context of controversy, of 
justification and criticism, of contestation of ideological practices of the past and 
present, within a framework that takes seriously the idea that our representations and 
understandings of the past and of events in the past have strategic, political and 
ideological consequences. 
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National commemoration 
In this paper I want to focus on a very specific ideological practice of transition in 
Eastern Europe, that of national commemoration. Although the ritualistic ‘Today we 
commemorate + event’ does not seem to be more than a reiteration of similar rituals 
performed earlier, commemoration can be seen as constantly testifying to the fact that 
‘the event was a true event, with a true emotional impact and true importance’ (Frijda, 
1997: 111).  It places the event and interpretations of it above that of subjective 
interpretations, constituting it ‘as an objective fact in the world’ (ibid.:111). It also 
‘testifies that it is a true historical event with a social significance and emotional 
implication of objectively large magnitude’ (ibid.: 111). At the same time, it constitutes 
and ‘authorizes’ a version of the past, as well as a version of events of the past.  In terms 
of national commemoration, mainly coming from individuals with representative 
duties, one can identify an attempt to put forward a, sometimes, non-controversial 
‘representative point of view, acceptable to the nation’ (Ensink, 1996: 211). 
However, as Turner has noted, ‘commemoration includes public rituals of 
remembrance and individual acts of recollection’, but also ‘public debates over the 
meaning and significance of historical events’ (Turner, 2006: 206). As Turner writes, 
‘the events commemorated in many cases stand for a larger, more complex and 
ambiguous set of events making up a decisive period in a nation’s history’ (Turner, 
2006: 208). What seems to be at stake is not only the emotional significance of an event 
and its true nature, but also the meaning of what is commemorated. The meaning of 
what is commemorated might be placed within an argumentative context, a context of 
justification and criticism (Billig, 1996).  
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In a national commemorative context, an analysis of the struggle over the meaning 
assigned to past events has to take into account the various discursive processes of 
representing and engendering an (almost) ‘mythical’ version of a given political and 
historical episode of national importance. The perspective espoused in commemorative 
contexts is not necessarily that of the ‘member’ with representative duties, but rather 
the representative point of view, acceptable to the nation and expressed in the name of 
the nation. For the outsider, the meaning assigned to a particular political ‘event’, the 
categorization of the ‘event’ is not necessarily placed within a context of controversy 
(Billig, 1996). For example, according to Timothy Garton Ash, ‘nobody hesitated to call 
what happened in Romania a revolution. After all, it really looked like one: angry 
crowds on the streets, tanks, government buildings in flames, the dictator put up 
against a wall and shot’ (1990: 20) 
The impact and the significance of the ‘revolution(s)’ in Eastern Europe seems to be 
intimately linked with commemoration moves (books are edited to re-discuss the 
phenomenon, presidents, prime ministers, politicians in national parliaments devote 
their times to the national historical and political significance of such an ‘event’ or 
series of ‘events’). Following Pierre Nora, one could argue that this process is part of 
commemorative memory and ritual that ‘can be viewed as framing, defining and even 
establishing a certain tension fundamental to the period in question’ (1998: 610). As it 
has been the case in Western Europe, one is witnessing an unnoticed passage from the 
‘historical to the remembered and the remembered to the commemorative’ (ibid.:626). 
In the context of Eastern Europe, commemorative discourses are central to discourses 
of transition. Moreover, in post-communist Eastern Europe, ‘commemoration is not a 
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mere adjunct to nation-building, but central to it’ (Turner, 2006: 208; see Bucur, 2001 
for a Romanian example). 
The device of commemoration is a ‘socially organized means of directing public 
attention toward an event as somehow focal or formative in collective experience’ 
(White, 1997: 71). As Pennebaker & Banasik have noted, ‘the creation and maintenance 
of a collective or historical memory is a dynamic social and psychological process. It 
involves the ongoing talking and thinking about the event by the affected members of 
the society or culture’ (Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997: 4). This process is ‘critical to the 
organization of the event in the form of a collective narrative’ (ibid, p. 4). One could 
argue that this process is also a political and ideological process, which may involve the 
posing of ‘questions about the present, and what the past means in the present’ 
(Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003: 1). It may not simply involve ‘talking and thinking’ about a 
particular event, for example, in terms of contradictory accounts of ‘what actually 
happened’ in the past, but may involve questions such as ‘who or what is entitled to 
speak for that past in the present’ (Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003: 1). As such, there may 
well be ‘agreement as to the course of events, but not over how the truth of those events 
may be most fully represented, or what should be the explanatory and narrative context 
that would make sense of a given episode’ (Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003: 1). 
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Commemorative political speeches 
Images of the past and recollected knowledge of the (events of) past are conveyed 
and sustained within the ritual performance of commemorative speeches. 
Commemorative political speeches are seen as being essential in bringing collective 
norms and values to a wider audience. The focus is on commemorative political 
speeches, commemorative addresses in particular. Such addresses are usually 
characterized as representative and epideictic (Schaffner, 1996; Sauer,1996; 
Ensink,1996; Ensink and Sauer, 1995). As critical discourse analysts have shown, 
commemorative addresses belong to a hybrid genre of the epideictic address, genre that 
combines the goals of persuasion and establishing consensus regarding norms and 
values in society (Sauer, 1996). Very often, these commemorative addresses are 
representative speeches at the same time – the speakers are mostly persons with 
representative duties, but not necessarily with political authority – a queen, a president 
(cf. Sauer, 1996).  
One might argue that commemorative addresses do not have any special pragmatic 
purpose, for, in a way, nothing will be said that has not been said many times before.  
Nevertheless, they can also be used as opportunities to respond to criticism, to build 
(rebuild) positions of political legitimacy and representativeness, to ‘authorize’ a 
preferred version of specific events and history. The significance of a commemorative 
address might also depend not only on its own content and design, but also on being an 
integral part of specific ‘dialogical networks’ (Leudar & Nekvapil, 2004) and 
‘community of agreement’ (Gergen, 2005) within the public sphere.  
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The case of Romania 
Although this might be seen by some as an unfounded claim, there is no wider 
consensus as to ‘what really happened’ in December 1989 and what is the name that 
should be given to the political ‘event’ that, first in Timi oara, and after that in 
Bucure ti, opened the way for democracy in Romania. The Romanian ‘revolution’ has 
been historically (and still remains) an issue of deep controversy among lay people, 
scholars and politicians – some authors have called it ‘quasi-revolution’ (Tism neanu, 
1993) or ‘unfinished revolution’ (Roper, 2000). Some authors argue that ‘the events of 
the December 1989 revolution left an ideological void, filled previously by the political 
imaginary of the Ceausescu regime’ (Adamson, 2000: 121).  
There have been attempts to reconstruct the events (see for example Ratesh, 1991), 
as there has been an interest on issues around myth-making and the revolution 
(Deletant, 1994). Researchers have also focused on the impact of the revolution on 
Romanian politics and revolutionary changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe 
(Tismãneanu, 1999; Antohi and Tismãneanu, 2000). There has also been a concern 
with charting the diverse interpretations of the ‘revolution’ in the public sphere of the 
‘elites’ (Cesereanu, 2004). The main interpretive dimensions that were identified dealt 
with the idea of a ‘pure’ revolution, the ‘plot’ hypothesis (internal/external) and the 
hybrid (revolution + coup d’état) (the terms are Cesereanu’s). 
This paper focuses specifically on the Romanian 1989 revolution and its 
commemoration in the Romanian parliament. This is part of a wider project concerned 
with how official and, in most instances, controversial political imaginary, and histories 
of the communist/post-communist past are produced and accomplished in talk and 
text, including the various ways in which the ‘Revolution of 1989’ has been represented 
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by political leaders who have taken part in the events during several relatively recent 
commemorative addresses in the Romanian parliament. For the purposes of this paper, 
I shall focus on two commemorative addresses (21 Dec 2000 and 18 Dec 2003) of the 
former Romanian president, Ion Iliescu (Head of State at the time).2 
Generally acknowledged as the leading political figure of post-1989 Romanian 
politics, Ion Iliescu has been a ‘dissident’ member of the Communist Party who has 
seized the opportunity to assume power in December 1989 and become the President of 
the first Romanian ‘democratic’ government, emerging, in a rather controversial 
fashion, from the revolutionary enthusiasm and fervor. His unexpected appearance in 
the studios of the Romanian television in December 1989 and the subsequent assuming 
of leadership of the National Salvation Front are only some aspects that made him a 
controversial figure of the Romanian ‘revolution’. He has been described as being the 
archetypal communist ‘new man’ (cf. Cesereanu, 2004: 84). He has been elected 
President of Romania three times: 1990-1992, 1992-1996, and 2000-2004. 
The commemorative address of 2000 follows his re-election as President after 
facing the extreme right-wing candidate, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, in a second-round of 
voting, who saw the majority of Romanians voting against the extreme right-wing 
extremism of Vadim Tudor, and not necessarily for Iliescu.  The commemorative 
address of 2003 has been his last public appearance as President of Romania 
commemorating and arguing for the ‘authenticity’ of the ‘revolution’. In December 
2004, he is no longer President as he loses to Traian B sescu in the second-round of 
Presidential elections. Iliescu’s case is conspicuous as he has been (and still is) a fervent 
supporter of the idea of ‘pure revolution’ (cf. Cesereanu, 2004: 73). These 
commemorative addresses can be considered excellent examples of his discourse on the 
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Romanian ‘revolution’. The main aim of these commemorative discourses has been to 
producing a dominant version of the Romanian ‘revolution’ as ‘authentic’, foundational 
and turning point in the nation’s history. As Cesereanu (2004) has noted, his discourse 
on the ‘revolution’ can mainly be seen as a reaction to accusations, levelled to him 
personally and his political team, of subverting and perverting the objectives and the 
‘real’ ethos of the Romanian ‘revolution’. One could argue that Iliescu has been using 
his presence as President in the commemorative sessions of the Romanian parliament 
as a political instrument, to critique the democratic political opposition. One of Iliescu’s 
main accusations towards the democratic opposition is that it destabilises the young 
Romanian democracy (apud Cesereanu, 2004: 84). 
My main concern is not with the ‘facts of the matter’ of the revolution (the factuality 
of an historical representation) or the wider political controversy, but how are the ‘facts’ 
described in order to ‘authorize’ a specific perspective of representing and explaining 
the ‘events’.  The argument is not only about ‘how a given version is authorized as that 
version which can be treated by others as what has happened’ (Smith, 1978: 33), but 
also who is ‘allocated the privilege of definition and how other possible versions or 
sources of possible disjunctive information are ruled out’ (ibid.: 33).  I am also 
interested in describing some of the discursive procedures that are being used to ensure 
the publicly accomplished recognition of the Romanian ‘revolution’ as revolution, and 
therefore, as a true and meaningful ‘object of commemoration’.  
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Analytic framework 
This paper is concerned with the situated discursive accomplishment of democratic 
consensus and representativeness in an (hegemonic) attempt to produce, reproduce 
and ‘authorize’ a worldview that proposes that existing, dominant political and 
categorical formulations of national history and significant events (the Romanian 
‘revolution’ of 1989) are the most appropriate in understanding the past and the future 
of the nation. What are the discursive processes involved in the ‘authorization’ of a 
preferred version and how this accomplishment may have the ideological function of 
framing/reframing, controlling the various interpretations, public (categorial) 
reformulations of events? A critical discursive analysis of political discourse based on 
ideological and rhetorical analysis (Billig, 2004), discursive psychology (Edwards & 
Potter, 2001) and membership categorization analysis (Sacks, 1995; Eglin and Hester, 
2003) has been used. The main focus is on participants’ orientations, members’ 
categories in use, and the detailed analysis of descriptions with issues of category work, 
accountability, and entitlement at stake.  
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Analysis 
Openings 
(1) 
1 Domnilor pre edin i ai Senatului  i Camerei Deputa ilor 
2 Doamnelor  i domnilor senatori  i deputa i 
3 Dragi prieteni din zilele  i nop ile Revolu iei din decembrie 
4 Onorat  asisten   
 
1 Mr President of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies 
2 Ladies and gentlemen senators and deputies 
3 Dear friends from the days and nights of the December revolution 
4 Esteemed audience 
 21 Dec 2000 
 
(2) 
 
1 Domnule pre edinte al Camerei Deputa ilor 
2 Distin i membri ai Corpurilor legiuitoare 
3 Distin i membri ai Guvernului 
4 Doamnelor  i domnilor reprezentan i ai Corpului diplomatic 
5 Onora i invita i 
6 Dragi prieteni revolu ionari 
7 Dragi compatrio i 
 
 
1 Mr President of the Chamber of Deputies 
2 Distinguished members of legislative bodies 
3 Distinguished members of Government 
4 Ladies and gentlemen representatives of diplomatic missions 
5 Honourable guests 
6 Dear revolutionary friends 
7 Dear fellow countrymen 
 18 Dec 2003 
 
Notice in examples (1) and (2) the way the speaker’s use of formal forms of 
address indexes his institutional rather his personal identity (cf. Drew and Sorjonen, 
1997). He is not only to be seen as acting as incumbent of an institutional role, but at 
the same time acting as incumbent of an institutional representative voice. At the same 
time, he also manages a positioning within the community of ‘revolutionaries’3. The 
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categories ‘revolutionary friends’ (ex. 2, l.6) and ‘friends from the days and nights of the 
December revolution’ (ex. 1, l.3) are offered in such a way as to be relevant to the topic.  
Note the use of ‘friends’ in both forms of address. The membership category 
‘friends’ can be said to carry with it a set of category-bound activities and imply a ‘locus 
for rights and obligations’ (Lepper, 2000: 196).  A particular (political) moral order is 
thus framed using categories such as ‘revolutionary friends’ and ‘friends from the days 
and nights of the December revolution’. The ‘friendship’ is defined trough the event, 
through taking part in the event: friends of the Revolution. 
The President is not only speaking from within the national community of which 
he is the representative, but also from within the community of revolutionaries, the 
community of the (active) participants in the ‘Revolution’. One could argue that this is 
not a simple rhetorical move of identifying with the audience (Billig, 1996), but a move 
of managing entitlement issues and framing a particular (political) moral framework in 
order to construct an ideological representation.  
The categories ‘revolutionary’ and ‘revolution’ are produced as recognizable and 
available for category work. These ways of addressing the audience organize the 
categorical features of the address, and can be seen as preliminaries to the relevance of 
warrantability, entitlement and accountability issues. The official warrant (President of 
Romania) is seconded and embedded in a sense of (personal) solidarity, camaraderie 
with the community of the participants in the Revolution. 
In so doing, the speaker lays claim to ‘an epistemological entitlement by virtue of 
category membership’ (Rapley, 1998: 331-332); he is not producing himself as merely a 
commemorator, a witness, but also as a participant: he is to be seen as claiming co-
membership in the category ‘revolutionary’. This is a very strong move of warranting an 
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epistemological and speaking entitlement and a preface to offering and authorizing a 
specific version of the Romanian ‘Revolution’. 
One can see this as a strategic move of managing category membership that 
inform argumentative procedures and display the warrantability (legitimacy) or un-
warrantability (illegitimacy) of what is being said within the commemorative context. 
As discursive psychologists have noted, this is one of the ways for the speaker to 
performing and managing various kinds of publicly sensitive business, including (his) 
motives and reasons for (doing) and saying things (cf. Edwards, 1997). 
 
Managing controversy 
 
(3) 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Prin profunzimea  i amploarea schimb rilor din decembrie 1989 
evenimentele respective nu au fost nici lovitur  de stat  i cu atât mai 
pu in echivalentul român al perestroicii sovietice care nu urm reau o 
schimbare de sistem ci doar o adaptare a sa.  
 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Through the extent and depth of the changes from December 1989 
the events in question have not been a state coup and even less  
the Romanian equivalent of the soviet perestroika, which were not after a 
change of system but only its adaptation 
 
18 Dec 2003 
          
 
(4) 
 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
 
Toate fabula iile politicianiste, cu care ne reîntâlnim  i care se repet   
an de an din 1990 încoace, nu numai c  nu au  
suport, ci exprim  lips  de cultur  politic  în cazul unora  
precum  i interese obscure în cazul altora, to i îns  
ignorând voit realit  ile  i faptele  
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65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
 
 All the politicianist confabulations, which one rehearses and which repeat 
themselves year after year, from 1990 onwards, not only that they don’t 
stand scrutiny, but they are the expression of a lack of political culture, for 
some, as well as obscure interests for some others, all of them, nonetheless, 
ignoring willingly the realities and the facts. 
 
18 Dec 2003 
 
 
 
And then he continues: 
 (5) 
  
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
 
  i mai absurd  este aser iunea conform c reia Revolu ia s-a sfâr it  
odat  cu fuga lui Ceau escu, dup  care ar fi urmat confiscarea acesteia. 
A adar, Revolu ia s-ar fi sfâr it atunci când ea înc  nu începuse. Prin 
Revolu ie se în elege un proces radical de schimb ri structurale ale 
societ  ii. Indiferent de modul în care se s vâr e te, violent sau 
pa nic, lovituri de palat, de stat sau comploturi de orice fel, pot contribui la 
declan area unei revolu ii, dar nu se pot substitui acesteia. O posibil  
lovitur  de stat sau complot care s -l fi anihilat pe Ceau escu ar fi fost 
un lucru benefic  i ar fi f cut posibil  evitarea v rs rilor de sânge, dar 
nu  
am avut aceast   ans .  
 
 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
 Even more absurd is the idea that the Revolution finished  
once Ceau escu fled, thereafter being confiscated.  
Thus, the Revolution would have finished before it even started. When one 
says Revolution one understands a radical process of structural changes in 
society. Independent of the way in which it takes place, violent or peaceful, 
coups de palais, coups d’etat or plots of any sort, they can contribute to the 
beginning of a revolution, but they cannot replace it. A possible coup d’etat 
or plot that would have annihilated Ceau escu would have been a good 
thing and would have made possible avoiding the bloodshed, but we did not 
have this chance  
18 Dec 2003 
 
 
In examples (3), (4) and (5), the context is that of justification and criticism 
(Billig, 1996). It is about what the appropriate claims about the ‘event’(s) should be. 
One strategy used for defending the object of commemoration (and implicitly the act of 
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commemoration) and ‘authorizing’ a specific version of events is constructing the views 
of the critics as ‘absurd’.  
The critical references to the alternative versions of interpretation of the 
‘event’(s) are brought off as rooted in objective elements such as ‘lack of political 
culture’ (ex. 4, l.67) or ‘obscure’ political ‘interests’ (l.68). The irrationality and 
absurdity of opposing perspectives is also brought off through recourse to ‘historical 
necessity’ and a ‘universal’ definition of revolution (ex. 5, l.72-76). In political language, 
‘absurdity’ might not necessarily be used to protect a view (Antaki, 2003), but to 
authorize an ideological representation. By pointing to the absurdity of the critics’ 
points of view it invites taking seriously the (ideological) perspective that is put forward.  
The alternative labels are mentioned: ‘A possible coup d’etat or plot…’ (ex. 5, l. 
76-77) or ‘the Romanian equivalent of the soviet perestroika’ (ex. 3, l.52). On one hand, 
there is a sense of directness in criticising the alternative meanings assigned to the 
event(s). On the other hand, the denial of alternative labels is not direct4: ‘A possible 
coup d’etat or plot that would have annihilated Ceausescu would have been a good thing 
and would have made possible avoiding the bloodshed, but we didn’t have this chance’ 
(ex. 5, l. 76-79). Note the use of ‘would have been a good thing’ and ‘would have made 
possible avoiding the bloodshed’. This can be seen as a move of ‘making a version 
factually robust’ (Edwards, 2003) by playing off possibility against actuality, as well as 
appearance against reality (Edwards, 1997). One can see this as part of a concession 
move (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999). Once the contrasting views are on the record, the 
speaker can put forward his own (ideological) perspective, ‘without being accused of 
being blindly dogmatic’ (Antaki, 2003: 96). 
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But with ‘we did not have this chance’ the concession is explained away, ruling 
out alternative explanations (and implicitly working as to question alternative 
categorizations) within a framework of possibility vs actuality/appearance vs reality. At 
the same time, this works as a sort of inoculation against stake and interest (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992). 
Another strategy is that of relying on category-bound knowledge and predicates 
as part of an ‘authorization’ move (Smith, 1978). One is provided with a preliminary set 
of instructions for how to read the phenomenon (cf. Smith, 1978): ‘When one says 
revolution one understands a radical process of structural changes in society’.  
‘Revolution’ is produced as an historical fact, therefore an issue independent of 
particular networks of agency. It is a sort of theoretical legitimation that provides 
“‘explicit representations of ‘the way things are’” (van Leeuwen, 2007: 103). It is 
nevertheless an argumentative definition of ‘revolution’ that is mobilized against 
alternative ‘definitions’ of the ‘event’. The speaker can be likened to the social scientist, 
who, when offering a ‘definition of a commonly used term’ does not merely rely on ‘an 
elaboration of internal meanings’, but produces it as ‘an argument against other 
definitions’ (Billig, 1996: 178). 
A specific ideological perspective on the Romanian ‘revolution’ is legitimized and 
authorized in terms of ready-made category-bound knowledge. A disembodied 
definition of ‘revolution’, appealing to a universal, reasonable audience (Billig, 1996) is 
presented as common-knowledge, what everyone purportedly knows.  
The audience is instructed to ‘hear’ the definition as the proper definition, as the 
definition. The procedures used for establishing the definition as ‘objectively known’ 
(Smith, 1978: 35) are not made explicit: it is a ‘definition’ that relies on category-bound 
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knowledge and predicates. The ‘identity’ of the ‘event’ is constructed through a 
categorial reference, through the invocation of a category with associated 
characteristics and features. It is also based on the assumption that ‘revolution’ is the 
kind of category that ‘must be seen to appear in the same way to anyone’ (Smith, 
1978:35). 
The implication is that critics seem to miss what is obvious to anyone else. This is 
not a matter of simply knowing ‘what a revolution is’, but realizing what are the 
category-bound predicates that can be used to describe a revolution (‘change of system’, 
‘radical process of structural changes in society’ etc.). The speech appears to be 
‘designed with regard to such matters’ (Edwards, 1997: 98, italics in original).   
Predicates such as ‘change of system’ (ex. 3, l. 52-53), ‘radical process of 
structural changes’ (ex. 5, l.73) come from a collection of terms that are specifically and 
commonly used to characterize a ‘revolution’ (this is also evident in the academic 
literature on ‘revolutions’, see Calvert, 1990 for example) so as to say that a ‘revolution’ 
is what it usually taken to be. For instance, according to Calvert and theoreticians of 
‘revolution’, ‘if nothing changes then it is not a revolution’ (1990, p. 16). For political 
actors, as well as for academics, this is not a simple issue of attribution preceding 
evidence: you categorize the event and that provides for how you interpret it (describe 
it). It is rather a case for: a) if the category is known, then its characteristics and 
features can be inferred; b) if the characteristics and features are known, then the 
category can be inferred. And this can be said to be an issue that relies on the logic of 
membership categorization analysis and the implicative relationship of category-bound 
knowledge and predicates and producing ‘identity’ (Sacks, 1995; Eglin and Hester, 
2003) 
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The ‘revolution’ is “objectivated, represented as a generalized and intangible 
‘phenomenon’ rather than as an action by specific actors” (van Leeuwen, 1995: 82). It 
comes to signify the natural process of historical change. The ‘revolution’ is an 
‘unexamined and unexaminable given’ (ibid.:82). One can discern a dilemma of 
agentialization/de-agentialization (van Leeuwen, 1995). On one hand, the ‘revolution’ is 
represented as being brought about by people claiming membership in the category  
‘revolutionary’, on the other hand, it is represented as ‘brought about … in ways 
impermeable to human agency’ (ibid.:96). The speaker acts as the historian, political 
scientist, sociologist of change for which ‘language can serve as a perfectly transparent 
medium of representation… if one can only find the right language for describing 
events, the meaning of the events will display itself to consciousness’ (White, 1978: 130, 
italics in original). 
 
Managing objectivity and authenticity 
Consider the following examples  
(6) 
 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
 
 … deformarea adev rurilor cu privire la revolu ie  
 i a adev rului însu i care este revolu ia a constituit o bun  bucat   
de vreme apanajul celor care, probabil, tocmai au absentat de la un 
asemenea crucial eveniment ori  i-au f cut calcule de profit politic  i 
social de pe urma lui. Trebuie s  spun c  nic ieri în lume un asemenea 
fenomen, cu determin ri complexe  i obiective, cum este revolu ia, nu a 
mai fost abordat în termeni discriminatori, de desconsiderare ori supus 
unui tratament fals justi iar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
 
 … the deformation of the truths regarding the revolution  
and of the truth in itself that is the revolution has constituted for a good 
while the appendage of those who, probably, have not been present in this 
sort of crucial event or have made calculations of political and social profit.  
I have to say that nowhere in the world such a phenomenon,  
with complex and objective determinations, such as the revolution, has been 
talked about in discriminatory terms, of inconsideration or subjected to a 
false justiciary treatment 
21 Dec 2000  
 
 
(7) 
 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
 
 Ca unul care, asemenea multora dintre cei prezen i sau nu  
la aceast  solemnitate, am participat direct la evenimente  i am de inut 
un anume rol, am respins  i resping categoric astfel de  
judec  i, pe care nu le socotesc altceva decât ca pe o încercare de fraudare 
a istoriei, a adev rului cu privire la valoarea  i for a idealurilor  
revolu iei  i, nu în ultimul rând, ca o tentativ  de împiedicare a  
împlinirii lor!  
 
21 Dec 2000  
 
 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
 
 As one of those who, like so many of those present or not present  
at this solemn meeting, I have directly participated in the events and had a 
certain role, I have been opposing and still categorically opposing such 
comments, that are nothing other than an attempt to fraud  
history, the truth regarding the values and the force of the ideals of the 
revolution, and last, but not least, an attempt to stop  
their fulfillment! 
 
21 Dec 2000  
 
 
 
In examples (6) and (7) one can notice a classic example of establishing authority 
through using personal experience. This move is accompanied by a direct reference to 
the actions of the critics: their ‘attempt’ to ‘fraud history’ (ex. 7, l.63-64), ‘the truth 
regarding the values and the force of the ideals of the revolution’ (l. 64-65) and ‘to stop 
their fulfillment!’ (l. 65-66). In the context of talking about ‘revolution’ they might even 
be categorized as counter-revolutionaries! 
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This voice is a ‘warranting voice’ (Gergen, 1989) that speaks from within the 
community of revolutionaries and thereby, explicitly claims, not only certain knowledge 
entitlements, but also certain criticism entitlements. Although not explicitly used, the 
category ‘revolutionary’ is taken for granted, it is not problematic. What is made 
problematic, even if not explicitly, are the ‘critics’ who, according to speaker, have no 
entitlement to claim membership in such a category.  
One can notice a shift from the institutional role and representative voice to the 
personal, biographical element, of not only witnessing the event, but having directly 
participated and having ‘had a certain role’: a sort of autobiographical passage that has 
the effect of establishing authority within a more general move of identifying with the 
community of the ‘revolutionaries’. One can also notice a theme of vested stake and 
interest on the part of those criticizing (calculations of political and social profit) (ex. 6).  
Not taking part seems to equal not knowing. Taking part is established as the 
sine qua non reason for being entitled to talk about the ‘event’. What I would like to 
argue is that this is not only a simple case of claiming ‘I know cos’ I was there’ (Tusting 
et al., 2002) to mount an argument against the ‘critics’, but also a case of taking into 
account how the speaker produces itself as an incumbent of an omni-relevant category: 
‘revolutionary’. The speaker establishes a relationship to the ‘event’ by virtue of 
producing himself as an incumbent of a specific category (cf. Eglin and Hester, 2003). 
There is a sense that it is important to making sure that the account given would 
not only be simply considered true and authentic in itself, but would be held in the 
collective memory of the nation as true and authentic. One gets a sense that the 
categorial framework of ‘revolution’ needs to be produced as ‘something which endures, 
and is not tied to a particular time and place’ (Davis, 1992: 216).  
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In (6), through the use of an extreme case formulation, the ‘hearably absurd’ 
(Antaki, 2003) nature of critics’ claims is constructed: ‘nowhere in the world such a 
phenomenon, with complex and objective determinations, as the revolution, has been 
talked about in discriminatory terms, of inconsideration or subjected to a false 
justiciary treatment’ (ex. 6, l.44-47). Denying ‘the truth in itself that is the revolution’ 
(l.41) is again produced as ‘hearably absurd’. This is a move of producing the Romanian 
‘revolution’ as a non-controversial ‘event’ (implicitly, the category ‘revolution’ is 
produced as belonging to a non-controversial categorial realm), not anchored in specific 
historical/political particularities. The sense of objectivity and authenticity is not only 
achieved through reference to the national community, but also a wider, universal 
‘community of agreement’ (Gergen, 2005: 108).  
 
(8) 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
 
Revolu ia român  a fost, deci, opera poporului român,  
ea îi apar ine poporului român. Revolu ia român  nu a fost  
un act artificial, gândit în nu  tiu ce birouri, de nu  tiu ce  
organiza ii subversive. Revolu ia român , ca toate revolu iile  
în general, ca  i în toate celelalte   ri, în 1989, a fost  
rezultatul unei crize profunde, în care a intrat vechiul sistem,  i al 
imposibilit  ii guvernan ilor de a mai oferi solu ii realiste  i 
acceptabile problemelor cu care se confrunta societatea româneasc . De 
aceea am afirmat  i afirm cu t rie faptul c  Revolu ia român  este un 
moment de cotitur  în istoria noastr  na ional , care a schimbat 
fizionomia societ  ii române ti, care a deschis calea unor transform ri 
profunde în plan politic, economic  i social. A a ceva se înf ptuie te 
sau nu, nu se poate  
nici confisca, nici fura. Revolu ia român  a fost,  
totodat , cea mai radical  din întreg spa iul fost "socialist"  
din Europa.  
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81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
 So, the Romanian revolution was the achievement of the Romanian  
people, it belongs to the Romanian people. The Romanian revolution  
has not been an artificial act, decided in I don’t know what offices, by I don’t 
know what subversive organisation. The Romanian revolution, like all 
revolutions in general, like in all other countries, in 1989, has been the 
result of a profound crisis of the old system and the  
impossibility of government to offer realist and acceptable solutions  
to the problems that the Romanian society was facing. That’s why I have 
said and emphasise again that the Romanian revolution is a cornerstone in 
our national history, which has changed the physiognomy of the Romanian 
society, which opened the way for profound political, economical and social 
transformations. Something like this, is either accomplished or not, it can 
be neither confiscated nor stolen. The Romanian revolution has been,  
at the same time, the most radical in the formerly “socialist” space of 
Europe.  
18 Dec 2003 
 
The building up of the authenticity and the true nature of the events is taken 
further in (8). Issues of stake, interest and entitlement in representing the ‘event’ are 
countered with a version of the ‘event’ as the ‘achievement’ of the action of the ‘people’, 
and therefore, ‘belonging to’ the ‘people’:  ‘Achievement of the Romanian people’, ‘it 
belongs to the Romanian people’ (l.80-81).  
The previously identified dilemma of agentialization/de-agentialization is still 
intact. The Romanian ‘revolution’ is said to be the achievement of the ‘Romanian 
people’, but also the result of the ‘profound crisis of the old system’ (l.85). There is a still 
a strong sense that although the ‘revolution’ ‘belongs to the Romanian people’, it is still 
to be seen as a ‘result of an irresistible force rather than the outcome of specific deeds 
and events’ (Arendt, 1965: 255-256). This is another opportunity for the speaker to 
formulate and orient (to) the ‘events’ as recognizable and accountable as ‘revolution’: 
‘Like all revolutions in general, like in all other countries in 1989’ it [the Romanian 
revolution] was the result of ‘a profound crisis of the old system and the impossibility of 
government to offering realist and acceptable solutions to the problems that the 
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Romanian society was facing’ (l.83-87). What this description provides is that, in the 
last analysis, the Romanian ‘revolution’ is like the other ‘revolutions of 1989’. The 
Romanian ‘revolution’ is placed within the historical ‘order’ and logic of the 1989 
revolutions.  
An attempt at argumentative closure is intercalated between two comments on 
the Romanian revolution:  ‘something like this happens or does not happen, it cannot 
be confiscated or stolen’ (l.91-92). The earlier apparent reasonableness of taking into 
account alternative political labels for the ‘event’ is turned into a peremptory assertion 
that goes against the various alternative versions that are said to be implicating vested 
interest, ‘implicating motive and intention’ (Edwards, 1997: 98). 
Although previously placed within the realm of argument and argumentative 
meaning, the specific version of events that is being produced is said to lie beyond 
argument. Whatever happened in Dec 1989 (the ‘revolution’) cannot be anything else 
than what is predicated by the speaker. Its ‘rhetorical force is to claim for one’s current 
argument the status of common knowledge, and thus render it hard to deny’ (Edwards, 
1997: 256, italics in original). The speaker is not only telling what the Romanian 
‘revolution’ is, but what it should be taken as.  
The ‘exceptionality’ of the Romanian revolution is emphasized. It is said to be the 
‘the most radical in the formerly socialist space of Europe’ (l.93-94). The Romanian 
‘revolution’ does not constitute thus a disconfirmation of the (historical) pattern of 
‘revolutions’; instead its special characteristics help confirm the genuineness of the 
historical pattern of revolutions in Eastern Europe. 
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(9) 
 
 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
 
 Dac , a a cum am mai avut prilejul s  ar t, o revolu ie schimb  
radical sistemul politic  i social  i consacr  ireversibilitatea  
schimb rilor fundamentale din societate, este de la sine în eles c  ea nu 
rezolv  de la bun început  i în mod definitiv toate problemele. Ea 
deschide calea evolu iei  i asigur  premisele solu ion rii lor. 
 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
 
 If, as I had the opportunity to show, a revolution changes radically  
the political and social system and consecrates the irreversibility of 
fundamental changes in society, it goes by itself that it does not  
resolve from the very beginning and definitively all the problems. It opens 
the way to evolution and ensures the premises for offering solutions. 
 
21 Dec 2000  
 
 
 
As in the previous account, the ‘event’ is constructed as following a normative 
moral and historical order, that of ‘revolutions’. Again, the representation of the ‘event’ 
is produced and controlled via its categorial reference. There is a shift from ‘what a 
revolution is’ to ‘what a revolution does’: ‘changes radically the political and social 
system and consecrates the irreversibility of fundamental changes in society’ (l.90-92), 
‘opens the way to evolution and ensures the premises for offering solutions’ (l.93-94). 
This shift is nevertheless based on the same invocation of category-bound knowledge 
and predicates. 
The comments are introduced with the use of an if-then’ structure (Edwards, 
1997).  This is used as a discursive resource for telling an ideological story of ‘what is the 
case’. And ‘what is the case’ is predicated on the ‘definition’ of ‘what a revolution does’ 
offered by the speaker.  ‘It goes by itself’ (l.92) nicely prefaces the comments on changes 
by reinforcing the previously offered example of ready-made category-bound 
knowledge.  
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 Categorial reference to ‘what a revolution does’ is used to respond to an implicit 
criticism about changes in society. ‘What a revolution does’ is centered on the issue of 
change: and not any kind of change (radical and fundamental changes) and points to 
how the revolution ‘consecrates’ the ‘irreversibility of fundamental changes in society’. 
There is still a sense of the previously mentioned dilemma of agentialization/de-
agentialization: changes are not brought about, but are ‘consecrated’ by the ‘revolution’. 
As in the previous examples, one can see how the ‘event’ is descriptively produced as 
‘following … some normative or expected order’ (Edwards, 1997: 144). The ‘event’ does 
not only ‘follow’ a normative order of ‘revolutions’, but also a normative order of 
fundamental ‘change’. The normative ‘identity’ of the ‘revolution’ is produced and 
predicated on the invocation of category-bound predicates such as ‘fundamental’ or 
‘radical’ changes.  
 This account works to establishing that this is how these things called 
‘revolutions’ happen and must happen - very similar move to the essentialist view in (8) 
- and what are their consequences. Again, this provides for ‘both the explanation of why 
things have happened and the determination of their appearance’ (Iniguez et al., 1997: 
242). 
 
The nation and the ‘revolution’ 
Not only is the ‘revolution’ in Romania constructed by exploiting category-bound 
knowledge and presented as part of a general historical pattern, but also as 
foundational moment and principle in national history. As such, to commemorate the 
‘revolution’ is to narrate the nation and its future. 
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(10) 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
 
 Nu pentru s r cie, nu pentru umilin   sau jaf  i corup ie  
s-a murit în revolu ie, ci pentru o via   demn , normal , pentru o  
societate cu adev rat democratic   i un viitor care s  aduc  într-
adev r prosperitatea. Ca act fondator al unei noi Românii, revolu ia a fost 
un act  
al responsabilit  ii supreme. Cauzele  i sentimentele acestei  
responsabilit  i trebuie s  ne domine pe to i.  
 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
It is not for poverty, or for humiliation or organized theft and corruption 
that one has died in the revolution, but for a decent, normal life, for a  
truly democratic society and a future that should undoubtedly bring 
prosperity. As a foundational act of a new Romania, the revolution was an 
act of supreme responsibility. The causes and the sentiment of this 
responsibility have to dominate us all  
 
21 Dec 2000  
 
 
(11) 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
 
 Este important s  tragem toate concluziile care se impun din  
judecata la care ne supune permanent na iunea român , s  ne 
orient m toate ac iunile politice în func ie de acest reper care 
înseamn  valorile, principiile  i obiectivele Revolu iei române  i s  
r spundem  
nevoilor  i a tept rilor cet  enilor în slujba c rora  
ne afl m to i cei ale i.  
 
 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
 
It is important that we draw all the conclusions that stem from the 
incessant judgment of the Romanian nation, it is important that we orient 
all our political actions in relation to this yardstick which are the values, 
the principles and the objectives of the Romanian revolution and that we 
respond to the needs and expectations of the citizens  
which we, all elected, serve 
 
18 Dec 2003 
 
           
In example (10), one can see an instance of a particularized account of the 
Romanian ‘revolution’. It seems to rely on a very Arendtian philosophy that contends 
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that what is ‘crucial … to any understanding of revolutions in the modern age is that the 
idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning should coincide’ (Arendt, 1965: 
29). There is a sense that the ‘event’ is described as embodying ‘enduring truths’ and 
values, and that, ‘it seems sensible …[these] should not be lost in the past’ (Davis, 1992: 
215) 
The category ‘revolution’ is made to work by constituting, through its situated 
use, a ‘collectivity’ morally organised with respect to specific ideas, values, 
commitments that could be said to be ‘revolutionary’ (freedom, social justice) (cf. 
Jayyusi, 1984: 52). The ascribed ‘foundational’ character of the ‘revolution’ constitutes a 
moral framework of ‘national responsibility’ and ‘togetherness’ (ex. 10 and 11) within 
reference to a time of hope in a future ‘that should undoubtedly bring prosperity’ (ex. 
10, l.82-83). The ‘values, the principles and the objectives of the Romanian revolution’ 
(ex.11, l.122-123) are the ones that should guide those of the Romanian nation. In a 
move of re-contextualization, the moral framework is linked to the sacrifice of those 
who ‘died in revolution’ (ex. 10, l.81). This could also be read as another attempt to 
authorize the trueness and authenticity of the Romanian ‘revolution’ (there is an 
implied sense that one would not be entitled to call it a ‘revolution’ if the ‘present’ did 
not live up to the expectations of the ‘foundational’ moment). 
Note the strategic use of a togetherness repertoire in ex. (10) and (11). This could 
be seen as a sort of wider mobilization discourse, one that goes beyond parliamentary 
acceptance (cf. Rapley, 1998).  What this does, is to establish the reasonableness of the 
(representative) position - that is, thinking about the Romanian ‘revolution’ from a 
particular perspective - and also establishing the identity of the reasonable politician. 
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 There is a sense that being the ‘commemorator’, witness of and active 
participant in the commemorated ‘event’, and reasonable politician are isomorphic (cf. 
Rapley, 1998). What this isomorphism allows is producing a togetherness and political 
consensus repertoire that entails going beyond criticism and responding ‘to the needs 
and expectations of the citizens which we, all elected, serve’ (ex. 11, l.124-125). This is a 
voice speaking from within the universal community of the ‘reasonable’ politician(s) 
serving the interests of the country. Consider ex. (12) 
(12) 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
 
 Trecutul  i prezentul se împletesc pentru a prefigura viitorul.  
Revolu ia român  a fost evenimentul care a declan at acele  
transform ri profunde  i de substan  , care ne permit s  afirm m, 
acum, c  viitorul României nu poate fi imaginat în afara viitorului Europei  
unite. Pân  s  ne atingem obiectivul strategic al ader rii la Uniunea 
European , ne-a mai r mas de parcurs un drum scurt, dar extrem de 
dificil  i de solicitant pentru to i românii, indiferent de pozi ia lor în 
societate.  
De aceea consider c   i în acest moment, în care cinstim memoria  
eroilor Revolu iei române, trebuie s  privim cu luciditate la ceea ce am 
realizat, dar mai ales la ceea ce nu am realizat  i mai avem de  
f cut pentru a ne atinge  elurile. 
 
 
 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
 
The past and the present interweave to prefigure the future.  
The Romanian revolution was the event which started those  
profound and substantial transformations which allow us to say, now, that 
the future of Romania cannot be imagined outside the future of a united 
Europe. We have a short way to go until we reach our strategic goal to join 
the European Union, but one extremely difficult  
and demanding for all Romanians, no matter of their position in society. 
That is why I consider that in this moment, when we pay tribute to the 
heroes of the Romanian revolution, we have to lucidly consider what we 
have achieved, but mostly what we have not achieved and what we have to 
do to attain our goals 
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In (12) one gets a clear sense that the time of transformations and change has 
been a progressive time. The ‘foundational’ time of the ‘revolution’ allows for 
considering achievements and preparing the future of the nation. This vision of 
progressive time is not divorced from commemorative time and context. On the 
contrary, the time of commemoration is the time for taking all those issues seriously: ‘in 
this moment, when we pay tribute to the heroes of the Romanian revolution, we have to 
lucidly consider what we have achieved, but mostly what we have not achieved and 
what we have to do to attain our goals’ (l.134-137). 
 The Romanian ‘revolution’ is constituted as an ‘event’ that embodies and heralds 
the values and goals that the nation aspires to. The ‘revolution’ is said to be at the same 
time the foundation, but also part and parcel of the political project of the nation. The 
‘revolution’ is constitutive of ‘projecting the future’ concerning both ‘future action and 
future reality’ (Dunmire, 2005: 484). 
 
Discussion 
In this paper I have been examining issues around national commemoration, 
collective memory, managing authenticity  and category memberships in the 
representation of a specific political ‘event’: the Romanian ‘revolution’ of 1989. As this 
paper has hopefully shown, the Romanian ‘revolution’ comes to being invested with a 
category-bound, ‘discursively constituted’ reality (Smith, 1999: 192). 
The construction of an ‘ideological argument through a dramaturgy of objective 
description’ (Edelman, 1988: 115) has been explored. There has been a focus on issues 
of agency, entitlement, and working with regard to actual or possible alternatives (cf. 
Edwards, 1997), categorical incumbency shifts, managing the authenticity and the true 
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nature of the ‘event’ through invoking category-bound knowledge and predicates 
commonsensically attachable to the notion of ‘revolution’, formulating and orienting to 
the ‘events of 1989’ as recognizable and accountable as ‘revolution’ and ‘foundational’ 
moment in national history. 
Although this kind of discourse seems explanatory, it is ideological in that it, 
paradoxically, ‘refuses explanations’ (Barthes, 1957/1993: 142). In this way, the order of 
commemoration and its ‘object’ are seen as ‘sufficient or ineffable’ (ibid.: 142). The 
notion of ‘revolution’ is given a ‘clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a 
statement of fact’ (ibid.: 143). Paraphrasing Barthes, if one states the fact of the 
(Romanian) ‘revolution’ ‘without explaining it’, one is ‘very near to finding that it is 
natural and goes without saying’ (143, italics in original)5. 
It is usually believed that the main objective of commemoration involves the 
construction of a ‘unitary and coherent version of the past’ (Misztal, 2003: 127). As 
Wertsch (2002: 125) has argued, a ‘dogmatic commitment to one – and only one – 
account of the past is a hallmark of collective memory, as opposed to history’. But 
nonetheless, there is a struggle over what is the nature of the ‘object of 
commemoration’ and the meaning that is ascribed to it for and in the name of the 
‘nation’ and collective memory.  
The commemorative ritual is part and parcel of instituting a political and 
historical ‘reality’. As Billig (1999) contends, ‘memory-stories … can be suspected for 
being partial in their patterns of inclusion and omission’, but ‘it is not so much that the 
past is censored, but that the past is being recruited, indeed created, to serve present 
purposes’ (p. 170). But the meaning and emotional aspect of commemoration can be 
easily subverted. In the present instance, this is to be seen in the context of an attempt 
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of dominant, representative political actors ‘to project their assumptions and visions [of 
the past] and of the future as universal and grounded in common sense’ (Dunmire, 
2005: 482). In a context of controversy, justification and criticism over the meaning 
that is to be assigned to a political ‘event’ of national importance, there is nevertheless a 
sense that there might be a ‘danger of the reinterpretation of critical political events’ 
(Teitel, 2000: 105). This could be seen as becoming more of a problem, as the ‘events’ 
are seen as constitutional, foundational of the (new) democracy and nation. There is a 
strong sense in these accounts that the identity of the Romanian ‘revolution’ is based on 
a historical and political ‘view for all time’. But, as Teitel has argued, ‘the attempt to 
entrench an identity based on a particular historical view for all time is itself an illiberal 
vision – no choice remains but plurality of narratives, instability and political dialectic’ 
(2000: 117).  
The image of the ‘event’ is placed in a signifying, semiotic chain that generates 
determinate meaning and creates a specific ‘representation’ of the ‘event’. From a 
discursive social psychological perspective, the discursive power of a categorial 
conceptualization of an ‘event’ ties together a moment of (arbitrary) closure (Eagleton, 
1991) and secures the meaning, in a normative and prescriptive way, involving 
‘avoidance of further memory-work, which might disturb the sovereignty of the 
accepted account of the past’ (Billig, 1999: 170-171) 
The ordinariness of the Romanian ‘revolution’ as ‘revolution’ is decreed by 
managing the designed accountability and its publicly accomplished recognition. The 
‘event’ is constructed as following a normative moral and (historical) order, that of 
‘revolutions’. But one should not stop at this observation. There is a sense of a clear 
political and ideological concern in the way that the ‘event’ is represented. An 
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ideological dimension is framed when it is implied that when one contests the label 
‘revolution’, one is also contesting the predicates, values, life-forms uniquely bound to 
this category (Leudar and Nekvapil, 1998). 
The significance of this particular version of the Romanian ‘revolution’ lies in it 
being produced via a categorial reference in political discourse. The political ‘event’ that 
is being commemorated acquires an ‘identity’ as it is cast into a category with 
associated characteristics or features. The occasioned ideological and political 
significance of a political ‘event’ having an ‘identity’ lies also in its consequentiality in 
and for the social and ideological context in which it is invoked. This version is made 
co-substantial with the official collective memory around the ‘events of 1989’. At the 
same time, the version offered is factually and rhetorically robust, as it subverts ‘what 
might be the case’, ‘in favour of a purportedly more insightful and adequate analysis’ 
(Edwards, 1997: 248)6. 
The original events ‘are lifted out of their local historical contexts and reshaped 
to the relevancies established’ (Smith, 1999: 185) for a commemorative (political) 
discourse. These established relevancies of a commemorative political discourse allow 
for the fulfillment of the ideological function of framing/reframing, controlling the 
various interpretations, public (re)formulations of the ‘event’ (the Romanian 
‘revolution’); allowing for the disconnecting of the ‘revolution’ from its controversial 
particulars, delegitimizing criticism, and alternative meanings attached to it.  
 
 36 
Notes 
 
1. See also attempts to consider the voice of the social and political actor in stories of 
social change in social movements research (cf. Davis, 2002; Polletta, 1998a, b; see also 
Tilly, 2002) 
 
2. The analysis has been based on transcripts of the commemorative addresses 
retrieved from the Romanian Parliament’s website at 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.home 
 
3. Taking account of the commemorative context, it might seem natural to acknowledge 
the ‘revolutionaries’ as part of the audience.  This may even be seen as a legitimate 
move, as no ordinary people, but ‘revolutionaries’ are remembered on this occasion. 
 
4. The account is carefully constructed, as the critics are not directly mentioned, as part 
of a move of de-personalizing of the referent (Montero and Rodriguez-Mora, 1998: 94). 
 
5. This is a similar process as the one identified by Barthes (1957/1993: 143) when 
writing about ‘myth’. One could argue that ‘passing from history to nature’, this specific 
representation of the Romanian ‘revolution’ ‘abolishes the complexity of human acts … 
gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any going 
back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes a world which is without depth, a 
world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things 
appear to mean something by themselves’. 
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6. One could also see this as a process of production of an ‘empty signifier’ that unifies 
‘a certain politico-ideological field’ (cf. Laclau, 1993) of commemoration and public 
discourse, an attempt at constructing and legitimating post-communist democracy, 
representativeness, collective memory as integral part of a ‘contested discursive terrain 
of political competition’ (Adamson, 2000: 120) 
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